Nation Building

Many have already commented on this, but let me add my two cents. One of the biggest problems plaguing the Bush administration is in dealing with the countries we have conquered, err liberated, after the combat has concluded. The US military waged a stellar campaign against Saddam Hussein's military in 2003, overrunning Iraq in mere weeks when even optimistic predictions foresaw months of bitter fighting. Then came the occupation, with its myriad mistakes and growing failures.

Should we be surprised by this? Conservative Republicans long criticized the Clinton administration for "nation building" in places like Bosnia. (The US and its allies put an end to genocide and helped create a stable, peaceful nation. My God! How horrible!) During the first presidential debate of the 2000 campaign, Bush was asked, "How would you go about as president deciding when it was in the national interest to use U.S. force, generally?" His response:

Well, if it's in our vital national interest, and that means whether our territory is threatened or people could be harmed, whether or not the alliances are -- our defense alliances are threatened, whether or not our friends in the Middle East are threatened. That would be a time to seriously consider the use of force. Secondly, whether or not the mission was clear. Whether or not it was a clear understanding as to what the mission would be. Thirdly, whether or not we were prepared and trained to win. Whether or not our forces were of high morale and high standing and well-equipped. And finally, whether or not there was an exit strategy. I would take the use of force very seriously. I would be guarded in my approach. I don't think we can be all things to all people in the world. I think we've got to be very careful when we commit our troops. The vice president and I have a disagreement about the use of troops. He believes in nation building. I would be very careful about using our troops as nation builders. I believe the role of the military is to fight and win war and therefore prevent war from happening in the first place. So I would take my responsibility seriously. And it starts with making sure we rebuild our military power. Morale in today's military is too low. We're having trouble meeting recruiting goals. We met the goals this year, but in the previous years we have not met recruiting goals. Some of our troops are not well-equipped. I believe we're overextended in too many places. And therefore I want to rebuild the military power. It starts with a billion dollar pay raise for the men and women who wear the uniform. A billion dollars more than the president recently signed into law. It's to make sure our troops are well-housed and well-equipped. Bonus plans to keep some of our high-skilled folks in the services and a commander in chief that sets the mission to fight and win war and prevent war from happening in the first place.

In the second debate that year, Mr. Bush said,

[The US involvement in Somalia] started off as a humanitarian mission and it changed into a nation-building mission, and that's where the mission went wrong. The mission was changed. And as a result, our nation paid a price. And so I don't think our troops ought to be used for what's called nation-building. I think our troops ought to be used to fight and win war.

So we see that foundational to Bush's view of the military is that they are there to fight and win, not to build a nation. In Iraq, we see this played out. The military fights brilliantly to win the war, then is totally unprepared for what comes after.

Interestingly, the future president said a key component in a decision to commit military forces to combat is "whether or not there was an exit strategy." The first question one can ask, of course, is what was the exit strategy in Iraq when the president made the decision to go? He presumably had one, but what was it? What I find more interesting looking back at this four years later is that Bush made a distinction between an exit strategy and nation building. He says, essentially, we need an exit strategy from a combat engagement but nation building is something different, again something played out in Iraq where the administration did very little occupation planning before the war began. What Iraq has demonstrated so clearly is that, in a war of conquest, nation building is an essential component of any exit strategy. Before we can leave Iraq or Afghanistan, we have to rebuild those nations. To fail to do so would simply bring chaos to those nations, turning them into breeding grounds for terrorist activity.

History is replete with examples of the consequences of not following military victory with nation building. The following are just a couple.

1. World War I destroyed the German imperial government, leaving a power vacuum in Germany. The European victors, against the advice of President Wilson, did not engage themselves in rebuilding Germany. Rather, they were content with imposing extreme punishment on the nation, which paralyzed its economy and undermined the fledgling democracy struggling to take root. The result of this shortsightedness? Adolph Hitler, who exploited the resultant power vacuum and chaos to his advantage, taking dictatorial power in 1933, later giving the world World War II and the Holocaust. Contrast this with end of the Second World War, in which the United States committed to a massive program of nation building in Germany and Japan. The result of this leadership? Two nations transformed into loyal allies and stable democracies.
2. Throughout the 1980's the United States supported Afghan insurgents fighting against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. When victory was finally achieved with the Soviet withdrawal, the United States did little for Afghanistan. Into the consequent vacuum eventually stepped the Taliban, who imposed order and a measure of stability to the nation. The group also provide safe haven for al Qaida.

We readily see the need for nation building as a followup to military victory. An "exit strategy" and nation building are inexorably linked, at least in a long term vision for success. When a president cannot see that, we are destined to fail in the long run.